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ARTICLES
POTHOLE LAWS, APPELLATE COURTS,
AND JUDICIAL DRIFT
Kenneth L. Gartner*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article begins by describing the structure of the
appellate system in New York state, introducing the features of
the typical New York pothole law, and summarizing the New
York cases that set the substantive and procedural background
for a discussion and analysis of judicial drift.

Although the names of the primary appellate courts in New
York’s multi-level judicial hierarchy can puzzle those who do
not practice in New York, their roles can be summed up in two
statements: First, the New York Court of Appeals is the state’s
highest court.1 Second, the New York Supreme Court, which is
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*Kenneth L. Gartner is a member of Lynn Gartner Dunne, LLP, Mineola, New York. He is
a former Nassau County District Court Judge, a former Special Professor at Maurice A.
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Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College.
1. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (addressing jurisdiction of Court of Appeals); id. § 2(c)–(e)
(addressing judicial-selection commission and providing that governor shall make
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the state’s trial court of general jurisdiction,2 acts through the
four Departments of its Appellate Division as the state’s
intermediate appellate court.3
Thus, although the name of the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court might suggest otherwise, it is the
New York Court of Appeals that “stands at the apex of a
hierarchy of appellate courts” in the state.4 The “basic premise”
underlying New York’s system of appellate courts is that
intermediate courts “will dispose with finality of the great
majority of the appeals, leaving for further review by the State’s
tribunal of last resort, the Court of Appeals, only a relatively
small number of selected cases worthy of such further review.”5
In fact, “[t]he primary function of the Court of Appeals, like that
of the United States Supreme Court in the Federal sphere, is
conceived to be that of developing an authoritative body of
decisional law for the guidance of the lower courts, the bar and
the public.”6
Decisions of the Court of Appeals are controlling authority
as to all inferior appellate courts in New York, including the
Appellate Divisions, as well as to all trial courts in the state.7

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 12 Side B
05/06/2019 10:22:20

appointments from among candidates submitted by commission); see also N.Y. JUD. L
§§ 62–63 (McKinney 2019).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b)–(k) (describing Supreme Court and its jurisdiction); see
also JANET DIFIORE & LAWRENCE K. MARKS, NEW YORK STATE COURTS: AN
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 2–3 (2016), available at http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files
document/files/2018-06/NYCourts-IntroGuide.pdf.
3. Each departmental Appellate Division consists of a presiding justice designated by
the governor, and associate justices, also designated by the governor, with the designees
selected from among elected judges of the Supreme Court. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4; see
also, e.g., THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 6 (2012), available at http://old.ny
sba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications/ThePracticeofLawinNewYorkStatemembers
only/Practice_of_Law_2012-2013.pdf.
4. ARTHUR KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 2 (3d ed. 2005).
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 3–4 (footnote omitted).
7. See, e.g., 28 N.Y. JUR. 2d Courts and Judges § 220 (2017) (explaining that
“[d]ecisions of the court of appeals which have not been invalidated by changes in statute,
decisional law, or constitutional requirements must be followed by . . . all lower appellate
courts, such as the appellate division . . . and by all courts of original jurisdiction”
(footnotes omitted)) [hereinafter Courts and Judges]. It bears noting, however, that the
Court of Appeals has limited jurisdiction. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3. It may hear an appeal
only if a litigant has the right to appeal, or if the granting of permission to appeal lies
within its discretionary power. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5601–5602.
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Decisions of any Appellate Division are controlling authority in
all Supreme Courts within that judicial department.8
B. New York’s Pothole Laws
In New York, “[p]rior written notice statutes create
conditions precedent to commencement of a negligence action
against a municipality,” providing that “before a person may
begin an action against a municipality . . . for a defect in a
roadway or sidewalk which caused injury, the entity must have
prior written notice of that defect or the action may not be
maintained.”9 Colloquially known as pothole laws, these statutes
“were enacted to limit municipal liability, and to reduce the
amount of money paid out in sidewalk and roadway claims.”10
C. Two Relevant New York Precedents: Yarborough and Indig
In Yarborough v. City of New York,11 the Court of Appeals
held that once a municipality establishes in a pothole case that
there is a lack of written notice, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to demonstrate . . . that the municipality affirmatively created
the defect . . . or that a special use resulted in a special benefit to
the locality.”12 And in Indig v. Finkelstein,13 the Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff’s burden on summary judgment is
not met by an allegation in a pleading.14 Facts and evidence are
required.15
41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 13 Side A
05/06/2019 10:22:20

8. Courts and Judges, supra note 7, at § 220 (analogizing effect of Appellate Division
decisions to that of Court of Appeals decisions and noting that Appellate Division
decisions “must be followed by the appellate term and by courts of original jurisdiction”).
9. Lewis J. Lubell, Note, Prior Written Notice Statutes in New York State: The
Resurrection of Sovereign Immunity, 10 TOURO L. REV. 705, 705 (1994).
10. Id. at 724 (footnotes omitted).
11. 10 N.Y.3d 726, 853 N.Y.S.2d 261 (2008).
12. Id. at 728, 853 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
13. 23 N.Y.2d 728, 296 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1968).
14. Id. at 729–30, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 371–72.
15. Id.
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II. JUDICIAL DRIFT IN THE SECOND DEPARTMENT
A. Judicial Drift Defined
Judicial drift can occur in two ways. One is when a
statement in a court’s decision, appropriately applied in that
case, is applied out of context as controlling authority in another
case. The second is if a case sets forth a holding that is
appropriate for its given facts, but is then applied in further cases
in which the underlying facts become over time less and less on
point with the original case.
Justice Dillon of the Appellate Division, Second
Department, has recognized the danger of judicial drift,
describing it as a concept that,
while not discussed openly anywhere in New York’s case
law, is considered behind closed doors at appellate courts.
It is a concept about which appellate courts are concerned
and guard against. “Judicial drift” regards the unintended
expansion of case law by applying one innocuous sentence
of a decision to a broader set of circumstances in a later
case that was never initially intended or foreseen.16

05/06/2019 10:22:20

16. Mark C. Dillon, The Extent to Which “Yellowstone Injunctions” Apply in Favor of
Residential Tenants: Who Will See Red, Who Can Earn Green, and Who May Feel Blue? 9
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 287, 358 (2011).
17. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3; N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5601–5602.
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This article addresses an example of judicial drift in Justice
Dillon’s own court—drift that has resulted in the Second
Department’s contradicting the Court of Appeals and has also
led to a split among the departments of the Appellate Division.
After drifting into this change, the Second Department is
now essentially trapped by a growing body of its own precedent.
Because the Court of Appeals may not, other than in
circumstances not implicated here, review non-final orders, the
change in the law into which the Second Department has drifted
is unreviewable.17 It will remain unreviewed unless either the
Second Department itself certifies the issue for review or a
plaintiff in a case from another department risks asking the
Court of Appeals to impose the Second Department’s
formulation on the other departments.
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18. See Section II(B)–(E), infra.
19. 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (1985); see also §II(D)(1), infra
(discussing Winegrad).
20. Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602(b)(2)(i), the Appellate Division can certify a
question of law to the Court of Appeals raised by its own non-final order. Pursuant to
sections 5601(d) and 5602(a) of the N.Y. C.P.L.R., however, the Court of Appeals does
not have the power on its own volition to review a non-final Appellate Division order. The
willingness of the Second Department to allow review would be the only check on its own
otherwise unreviewable power, at least until such time as—and in the unlikely event that—
the issue is raised in a final order issued by the Second Department. See generally
KARGER, supra note 4, at chs. 3–4, 10.

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 14 Side A

This change in the law can be traced through a series of
decisions18 in which the Second Department has taken a remark
in Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center19 about the
evidentiary standard for summary judgment in medicalmalpractice cases, and
x changed and expanded it,
x given it new burden-shifting significance,
x applied it to personal-injury actions against third
parties who contract with landowners alleged to
have created or maintained dangerous conditions on
their properties, and only then
x applied it, as expanded, to pothole actions against
municipalities.
These Second Department decisions have effectively
countermanded the rule recognized by the Court of Appeals in
Yarborough, shrinking the safe harbor created by pothole laws.
This situation may prove intractable for some time. All of
the pothole cases in which the Court of Appeals has addressed
the issue involved summary judgments dismissing plaintiffs’
complaints, so in every one of them a plaintiff was seeking
review of a final order. But the Second Department’s new
doctrine will always result in non-final orders (denials of
summary judgment motions filed by municipal defendants),
which will keep pothole cases active. Review by the Court of
Appeals will in consequence be difficult to secure.20
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B. The Second Department’s Drift into Changing the Law:
The Decision in Fornuto
The plaintiff in Fornuto v. County of Nassau21 was injured
when he fell off his bicycle after slipping on loose pebbles left
on a paved trail weeks after a pothole repair by the municipality.
The Second Department held that because affirmative creation is
an exception to the pothole law, once the plaintiff alleged that
the municipality had affirmatively created the condition, it was
the municipality’s burden on summary judgment to come
forward with evidence to disprove the allegation.22 When asked
to allow the Court of Appeals to review this determination, the
Second Department refused.23
C. Behind the Decision in Fornuto:
The Decisions in Beiner and Loghry

The plaintiff alleged, in her pleadings, that the defendant
negligently maintained and repaired the sidewalk and
affirmatively created the defective condition that caused the
accident. Thus, to establish its prima facie entitlement to

05/06/2019 10:22:20

21. 149 A.D.3d 910, 52 N.Y.S.3d 435 (2d Dep’t 2017).
22. Id. at 911, 35 N.Y.S. at 436.
23. Fornuto v. County of Nassau, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op 82045(U) (N.Y. App. Div., 2d
Dep’t Aug. 7, 2017) (denying motion for leave to reargue appeal or, in the alternative, for
leave to appeal to Court of Appeals).
24. 149 A.D.3d 679, 51 N.Y.S.3d 578 (2d Dep’t 2017).
25. 149 A.D.3d 714, 53 N.Y.S.3d 318 (2d Dep’t 2017).
26. Beiner, 149 A.D.3d at 680, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 580–81 (quoting Foster v. Herbert
Slepoy Corp., 76 A.D.3d 210, 905 N.Y.S.2d 226 (2d Dep’t 2010)) (citations omitted);
Loghry, 149 A.D.3d at 715, 53 N.Y.S.3d at 320 (same).

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 14 Side B

Shortly before Fornuto, the Second Department had
decided Beiner v. Village of Scarsdale24 and Loghry v. Village of
Scarsdale.25 Each made clear that the sort of allegation later
confirmed in Fornuto as shifting the burden on summary
judgment in a pothole case was made in a pleading alone. Using
virtually identical language in each opinion, the Second
Department concluded in both cases that “the prima facie
showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary
judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the
plaintiff in the pleadings.”26 Its analysis was brief:
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judgment as a matter of law, the defendant was required to
demonstrate, prima facie, both that it did not have prior
written notice of the alleged defect, and that it did not
27
create the alleged defect.

Because the primary authority relied upon in Beiner and
Loghry—which, like Fornuto, contradict Yarborough and
Isrig—was Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp.,28 a review of the
cases preceding Foster is necessary to an understanding of how
judicial drift brought the law in the Second Department to this
point.
D. Behind the Decisions in Foster, Beiner, and Loghry:
The Decisions in Winegrad and Alvarez
1. The Winegrad Decision

05/06/2019 10:22:20

27. Beiner, 149 A.D.3d at 680, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 580–81 (citations omitted); Loghry, 149
A.D.3d at 715, 53 N.Y.S.3d at 320 (same); see also Nachamie v. County of Nassau, 147
A.D.3d 770, 772, 47 N.Y.S.3d 58, 62 (2d Dep’t 2017) (noting that the defendant “failed to
show that it was entitled to summary judgment based on its prior written notice statute . . .
as the plaintiffs alleged in their respective pleadings that it affirmatively created the alleged
defect that caused their damages, and it failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not do
so” (citation omitted)).
28. 76 A.D.3d 210, 905 N.Y.S.2d 226 (2d Dep’t 2010).
29. 64 N.Y.2d 851, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316.
30. Id. at 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
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The Second Department purported in Foster to rely on
Winegrad 29when giving allegations in pleadings a significance
at odds with the established rule that a plaintiff’s burden on
summary judgment is not met by mere allegations. But
Winegrad stands only for the proposition that when a pleading in
a medical-malpractice case apprises the defendants of the
elements of the plaintiff’s claim, the defendants must, in order to
make out a prima facie case for summary judgment, address
those pleaded facts instead of resting on “bare conclusory
assertions.”30 Thus, if the injured patient has described harm
“purportedly caused by the negligence of defendants” and the
defendants have “acknowledged that at least in some part the
alleged injury actually occurred,” the defendants’ contending
only that that the treatment at issue “did not deviate from good
and accepted medical practices, with no factual relationship to
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the alleged injury,” does not entitle the defendants to a grant of
summary judgment.31 This is the rule of Winegrad.
2. The Alvarez Decision
In Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital,32 which the Second
Department also cited in Foster, the Court of Appeals
emphasized the narrow impact it expected Winegrad to have:
As we have stated frequently, the proponent of a summary
judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering
sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any
material issues of fact . . . . Failure to make such prima
facie showing requires a denial of the motion, regardless of
the sufficiency of the opposing papers. . . . Once this
showing has been made, however, the burden shifts to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment to
produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to
establish the existence of material issues of fact which
require a trial of the action.

****

05/06/2019 10:22:20

31. Id., 487 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
32. 68 N.Y.2d 320, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1986).

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 15 Side B

Winegrad . . . is not to the contrary. There, the plaintiff
alleged, among other things, that the defendant doctors had
misrepresented that the surgery was completed when in fact
they had failed to complete the surgery and alleged further
that they were not qualified to treat plaintiff. All that was
tendered by the doctors in support of their summary
judgment motion was an affidavit by each which did no
more than simply state, in conclusory fashion, that they had
acted in conformity with the appropriate standard of care.
On the record in that case, we held that the “bare
conclusory assertions echoed by all three defendants that
they did not deviate from good and accepted medical
practices, with no factual relationship to the alleged injury,
do not establish that the cause of action has no merit so as
to entitle defendants to summary judgment.” . . . By
contrast, [the] papers here refute by specific factual
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reference the allegations of malpractice made by plaintiff in
her amended complaint and bill of particulars.33

This enunciation by the Alvarez court of an evidentiary
standard applicable to a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment in a medical-malpractice action did not reverse Indig
or alter the summary-judgment standard articulated there, did
not change the import of pleadings on motions for summary
judgment, and did not purport to shift any burden of proof. It
was in fact never read as having made any of these changes until
the Second Department gave it a new interpretation in Foster a
quarter of a century later.
E. The Foster Decision and Judicial Drift
in the Second Department

05/06/2019 10:22:20

33. Id. at 325–26, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 925–26 (citing Winegrad) (citations omitted); see
also Pullman v. Silverman, 28 N.Y.3d 1060, 1062, 43 N.Y.S.3d 793, 795 (2016) (relying
on Alvarez and Winegrad).
34. 98 N.Y.2d 136, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120 (2002).
35. Id. at 139, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (quoting H.R. Moch Co. v Rensselaer Water Co.,
247 N.Y. 160, 168 (1928) (recognizing that a contractual obligation alone does not in
general lead to liability in tort because imposing it “under such circumstances could render
the contracting parties liable in tort to ‘an indefinite number of potential beneficiaries’”
(internal citation omitted))).
36. Espinal, 98 N.Y.2d at 143, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 125 (affirming Second Department’s
decision below).

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 16 Side A

In Foster, the Second Department construed Espinal v.
Melville Snow Contractors, Inc.,34 a negligence action against a
contractor who had undertaken to perform work at a premises.
The general rule in those circumstances is that the contractor has
no duty to third parties, and so cannot be made a target of an
action for injuries that a third party suffers on the premises.
However, there are exceptions, including one that is at least
superficially similar to the affirmative-creation exception in
actions brought under a pothole law: the situation in which the
contractor has “launched a force or instrument of harm.”35 The
Court of Appeals discussed that exception in Espinal, which
affirmed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment
for the defendant contractor.36
The plaintiff’s unsupported assertions in Espinal that
Melville created a dangerous and hazardous condition when
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plowing snow on defendant’s property, causing her to slip and
fall, were insufficient to sustain the action because Melville
“simply cleared the snow as required by the contract.”37 As the
Court of Appeals concluded, “the plaintiff’s fall on the ice was
not the result of Melville having ‘launched a force or instrument
of harm.’” 38
Yet although Espinal affirmed the grant of summary
judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action, the Second
Department determined in Foster that Espinal stands for the
principle that if the plaintiff had made at least some allegations
against Melville in her pleadings, summary judgment might not
have been granted.39 Adding this construction of Espinal to the
burden-shifting statement in Winegrad about conclusory
assertions from doctors being sued for malpractice, the Foster
court determined that despite the longstanding rule of Indig, a
bare pleading was sufficient to shift the burden of proof on a
motion for summary judgment.40 Combining an out-of-context
statement from Winegrad, a medical-malpractice case, with an
out-of-context assessment of what might have been in Espinal, a
contractor-negligence case, to reach a new result applicable in
pothole cases is judicial drift.
III. THE SPLIT BETWEEN DEPARTMENTS

05/06/2019 10:22:20

37. Id. at 142, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 124 (citation omitted).
38. Id.
39. Foster, 76 A.D.3d at 214, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 228–29 (asserting that “the prima facie
showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by
the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings” (citing cases, including
Winegrad)).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Kevin G. Faley & Kenneth E. Pitcoff, The “Creation Exception” to the
Pothole Law: Difficult to Prove, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 2017, at 4 (recognizing established
rule that burden is initially on defendant to show lack of prior written notice, but that

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 16 Side B

It appears that the migration of the Winegrad statement
through the decisions of the Second Department while growing
from a guideline into a burden-shifting principle and moving
from medical-malpractice cases into a contractor-negligence
case and then expanding into cases involving pothole laws has
all occurred without discussion or attention from courts and
commentators.41 In fact, litigants in the Second Department do
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not seem to have had an opportunity to address the spread and
expansion of the Winegrad statement.
Now essentially trapped by its own body of burden-shifting
precedent, the Second Department seems unlikely either to
reconsider its analysis or subject it voluntarily to scrutiny by the
Court of Appeals. Yet municipal defendants are unlikely to be
able to invoke the appellate process to challenge denials of
summary judgment made under the Second Department’s
misapplication of the Winegrad statement to pothole cases.42
This will leave the Second Department at odds with the other
departments of the Appellate Division.
The
Second
Department’s
new
interpretation
notwithstanding, the Third Department applied the traditional
Yarborough standard in Chance v. County of Ulster,43 pointing
out that “[w]hen a defendant establishes that it did not receive
prior written notice of the alleged defect, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to raise issues of fact as to the applicability of an
exception to the written notice requirement.”44 The Chance
court also explicitly rejected an argument that echoes the Second
Department’s new position:

In accordance with its rejection in Chance of the Second
Department’s developing Biener-Loghry-Fornuto doctrine, the
Third Department has continued to apply the usual Yarborough
rule when considering a summary-judgment motion seeking to

05/06/2019 10:22:20

burden then shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate defendant’s immediate creation of dangerous
condition through affidavits, depositions, or expert testimony instead of “mere pleadings,”
but failing to note that this is no longer the law in the Second Department).
42. See text accompanying note 20, supra (discussing predicament of municipal
defendants in pothole cases arising in the Second Department).
43. 144 A.D.3d 1257, 41 N.Y.S.3d 313 (3d Dep’t 2016).
44. Id. at 1258–59, 41 N.Y.S.3d at 315 (citing Yarborough) (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 1259 n.1, 41 N.Y.S.3d at 315 n.1 (citing Yarborough).

41315-aap_19-2 Sheet No. 17 Side A

Plaintiffs argue that a defendant cannot shift the burden on
such a motion for summary judgment absent proof that no
issues of fact exist as to the application of any exception to
the written notice requirement. We disagree, as such an
argument is contrary to Court of Appeals precedent
establishing the aforementioned general rule as to
45
defendant’s initial burden.
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dismiss the plaintiff’s case in a pothole action.46 The Second
Department’s divergent path, based on a newly minted
interpretation of a twenty-five-year-old case, has thus created a
conflict that deserves the attention of the Court of Appeals and
perhaps the Legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION

05/06/2019 10:22:20

46. See, e.g., Hockett v. City of Ithaca, 149 A.D.3d 1378, 52 N.Y.S.3d 575 (3d Dep’t
2017) (granting summary judgment for failure to comply with notice provision in pothole
law despite plaintiff’s allegations that defect was created by defendant municipality).
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Judicial drift in the Second Department of the New York
Appellate Division has had, and will continue to have, realworld consequences. The situation in New York City is
illustrative. At present, pothole cases against the City of New
York are likely to result in summary judgment for the City in
Manhattan and the Bronx, which are in the First Department.
But the City must take pothole cases brought on the same facts
and pleadings to trial—or settle them—in Brooklyn, Staten
Island, and Queens, which are in the Second Department.
Simple fairness suggests that this is inappropriate, particularly
because it appears that the same dichotomy will exist with
respect to pothole cases brought against municipalities in the
Second Department counties of Dutchess and Orange, as
opposed to those brought in the adjoining Third Department
counties of Sullivan, Ulster, and Columbia.
Eventually, the Second Department’s Foster-based
alteration of the controlling Yarborough standard for summary
judgment may triumph and be accepted by the other judicial
departments, or the Second Department may eventually revert to
an interpretation that is consistent with the rest of the state’s
conceptualization of the relevant law. But either approach will
require—at best—years of litigation before the conflict between
departments is resolved, and there is in fact no reason to believe
that the other departments of the Appellate Division will ever
adopt the Second Department’s new rule or that the Second
Department will ever revert to the majority position.
In these circumstances, the only ways in which this split
can be resolved are
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47. 14 A.D.3d 301, 788 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1st Dep’t 2005).
48. Id. at 302, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 68 (overruling Torres v. City of New York, 306 A.D.2d
191, 762 N.Y.S.2d 67 (2003)).
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if the issue is raised on a final order from a pothole
case in the Second Department, so that the Court of
Appeals has the power to review it;
x if a plaintiff against whom summary judgment has
been granted in another Department secures
permission to appeal a pothole case to the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the Second
Department’s conception is correct, and that the
other Departments should apply its new rule; or
x if the Legislature takes action.
Unless and until one of these possibilities occurs, the judicial
drift in the Second Department will make it an outlier in pothole
cases.
It is worth remembering in these circumstances that the
decision originally articulating the immediacy requirement in a
pothole case, Bielecki v. City of New York,47 reflected the First
Department’s refusal to institute a new rule in a similar
situation. It explained instead that extending the affirmativenegligence exception to cases in which the plaintiff “alleged that
a dangerous condition developed over time from an allegedly
negligent municipal repair” would allow that exception to
“swallow up the requirement itself, thereby defeating the
purpose of the Pothole Law.”48 The Second Department’s
judicial drift now poses the same sort of threat to the traditional
allocation of burdens of proof on summary judgment in pothole
cases. The long-established Yarborough rule may now be
swallowed up in the Second Department by its new BeinerLoghry-Fornuto rule. This would, as the Court of Appeals
recognized on analogous facts in Bielecki, defeat the purpose of
the pothole law.

